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Abstract
We study incentive issues related to two-sided one-to-one stable match-
ing problem after weakening the notion of strategy-proofness to Ordinal
Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (OBIC). Under OBIC, truthtelling is re-
quired to maximize the expected utility of every agent, expected utility being
computed with respect to the agent’s prior beliefs and under the assumption
that everybody else is also telling the truth. We show that when preferences
are unrestricted there exists no matching procedure that is both stable and
OBIC. Next preferences are restricted to the case where remaining single is
the worst alternative for every agent. We show that in this case, if agents
have uniform priors then the stable matchings generated by “deferred ac-
ceptance algorithms” are OBIC. However, for generic priors there are no
matching procedures that are both stable and OBIC even with restricted
preferences.
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1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to explore issues in incentives related to matching
problems and design of matching procedures.
Matching problems refer to problems which involve matching members of one set
of agents to members of a second, disjoint set of agents all of whom have preferences
over the possible resulting matches. We focus attention on two-sided, one-to-one
matching where each agent is matched to at most one mate. A fundamental notion
in this context is a stable matching which can be defined as a matching such
that there does not exist a pair of agents who would prefer to be matched to
each other than to their current partners. Such a matching is in the core of the
corresponding cooperative game which would result if individual agents were able
to freely negotiate their own matches. Gale and Shapley (1962) show that the set
of stable matchings is non-empty.
In the strategic version of the model the preferences of the agents are private in-
formation. Therefore any stable matching is computed on the basis of the reported
preferences. The agents know that by reporting different preferences they can al-
ter the stable matching that is selected and hence change their mate. A natural
question which arises is whether matching procedures can be designed which give
the agents incentive to truthfully reveal their preferences in equilibrium, and which
produce stable matchings. The truth-telling concept preponderant in the literature
is strategy-proofness. Under strategy-proofness it is a dominant strategy for all the
agents to truthfully reveal their preferences. The question is does there exist a
stable matching procedure that is strategy-proof. Roth (1982) demonstrates that
there does not exist any matching procedure which is strategy-proof and which
also generates stable matching at every profile of preferences. This result is similar
in spirit to a number of impossibility results present in the social choice literature,
in the context of designing non-dictatorial social choice procedures which operate
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in fairly unrestricted domains (Gibbard (1973), Satterthwaite(1975)).
In this paper we weaken the truth-telling requirement from strategy-proofness
to ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility (OBIC). This notion was introduced in
d’Aspremont and Peleg (1988) in the context of a different problem, that of repre-
sentation of committees. It has also been analysed in standard voting environments
in Majumdar and Sen (2003). Truth-telling is required to maximize the expected
utility of each individual where expected utility is computed with reference to the
individual’s prior beliefs about the (possible) preferences of other individuals and
based on the assumption that other individuals follow the truth-telling strategy.
However, this truth-telling notion has one important difference with the standard
notion of Bayesian incentive compatibility used widely in incentive theory (for ex-
ample auction theory). Under OBIC truth-telling is required to maximize expected
utility for every representation of an individual’s true preference ordering. Roth
(1989) applies the notion of Bayesian incentive compatibility to the stable match-
ing problem. He generalizes the Roth (1982) result to the case where truth-telling
is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the revelation game. However, he assumes particu-
lar cardinalization of utilities and makes specific assumptions about priors. Since
stable matchings only considers preferences and since individual preferences are or-
dinal, a more appropriate equilibrium notion would be ordinal Bayesian incentive
compatibility.
Even though ordinal Bayesian Incentive Compatibility is a significant weakening
of the truth-telling requirement, our first result is that there does not exist any
prior such that there exists a stable matching procedure that is ordinally Bayesian
incentive compatible with respect to it.
Our next step is to look for possibility results by putting restrictions on the
set of allowable preferences of the agents. Alcalde and Barbera´ (1994) look at
possibility results by restricting the set of allowable preferences but maintaining
strategy-proofness as the notion of truth-telling. We restrict attention to the class
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of preferences where each agent prefers to be matched than to remain single and
show that when each individual’s belief about the preferences of others is uniformly
and independently distributed then there exist stable matching procedures that are
ordinally Bayesian incentive compatible. In a recent paper, Roth and Rothblum
(1999) consider stable matching in an incomplete information environment where
agents have what they call “symmetric beliefs”. If beliefs are uniform then they
are symmetric. Roth and Rothblum discuss stochastic dominance of one strategy
over others in such an environment. They show that if the stable matching proce-
dure is the man proposing deferred acceptance algorithm then for any woman with
symmetric beliefs any strategy that changes her true preference ordering of men is
stochastically dominated by a strategy that states the same number of acceptable
men in their correct order. This latter strategy is called a Truncation strategy.
Basically, a truncation strategy for a man or a woman is a preference ordering
which is order-consistent with his or her true preference but has fewer acceptable
men or women. Detailed analysis of truncation strategies can be found in Roth
and Vande Vate (1991), Roth and Rothblum (1991), Ma (2002) among others.
Roth and Peranson (1991) contains an empirical study using truncation strategies.
Ehlers (2001) gives an alternative condition to the symmetry condition on beliefs
that leads to the same result. However, neither Roth and Rothblum paper nor
the Ehlers paper analyse equilibrium behaviour of agents. Our possibility result
with uniform priors follows immediately from and can be seen to be an equilibrium
interpretation of the Roth and Rothblum (1999) and the Ehlers (2001) results.
One remark needs to be made here. Our result with uniform priors is an existence
result. There are a number of distributions that satisfy the criterion of symmetric
beliefs. Uniform beliefs is just one of them.
Our main result in this paper is to show that this possibility result is non-
generic. We assume common independently distributed prior for all individuals
and show that for each individual i there exists a set of conditional beliefs Ci which
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is open and dense in the set of all conditional beliefs and whose complement set
is of Lebesgue measure zero, such that no stable matching procedure exists that is
ordinally Bayesian incentive compatible with respect to a prior belief µ such that
the conditionals generated by µ lie in Ci.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we set out the basic notation and
definitions. Section 3 deals with the case of unrestricted preferences. In section 4 we
consider restricted preferences. In subsection 4.1 we deal with uniform priors while
subsection 4.2 considers generic priors. Section 5 concludes. Appendix A contains
the deferred acceptance algorithm while Appendix B briefly discusses symmetric
beliefs.
2 Preliminaries
We assume that there are two disjoint sets of individuals which we refer to as the
set of men and women. These sets are denoted byM andW respectively. Elements
in M are denoted by m, m′ etc and elements is W are denoted by w, w′ etc. Let
I ≡ M ∪W denote the entire set of agents. Each man m ∈ M has a preference
ordering Pm over the set W ∪ {m}. Let Pm be the set of all possible preference
orderings for man m. Each woman w has a preference ordering Pw over the set
M ∪ {w}. Let Pw denote the set of all possible preference orderings for woman w.
We denote by P = ((Pm)m∈M , (Pw)w∈W ), a preference profile for all the agents. Let
P = ×i∈IPi denote the set of all such preference profiles. We assume that these
orderings are strict. We denote by P−i the collection of preferences for all agents
other than i. The set of all such P−i’s is denoted by P−i = ×j 6=iPj.
We will usually describe an agent’s preferences by writing only the ordered set
of people that the agent weakly prefers to remaining single. Thus the preference
Pm described below,
Pm := w1Pmw2PmmPm, · · · , Pmwk
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will be abbreviated to,
Pm := w1Pmw2Pmm
For reasons that will be obvious shortly, it will suffice only to consider these ab-
breviated preferences.
Definition 2.1 A matching is a function ν : I → I satisfying the following
properties:
• ν(m) ∈ W ∪ {m}
• ν(w) ∈M ∪ {w}
• ν(ν(i)) = i ∀i ∈ I
We now define a stable matching. Let A(Pi) = {j ∈ I|jPii} denote the set of
acceptable mates for agent i. Obviously for a man m with preference ordering Pm,
A(Pm) ⊆ W and similarly for a woman w with preference Pw, A(Pw) ⊆M .
Definition 2.2 A matching ν is stable if the following two conditions are satisfied
• for all i ∈ I, ν(i) ∈ A(Pi) ∪ {i}
• there does not exist (m,w) ∈M ×W such that wPmν(m) and mPwν(w)
Let S(P ) denote the set of stable matches under P . Gale and Shapley (1962)
shows that S(P ) is always non-empty for all P ∈ P .
Let M denote the set of all possible matchings. A matching procedure is a
mapping that associates a matching with every preference profile P .
Definition 2.3 A matching procedure is a function f : P →M
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If f is a matching procedure and P is a profile, then fi(P ) denotes the match
for i selected by f under P .
A stable matching procedure f selects an element from the set S(P ) for every
P ∈ P . The rest of the essay is concerned only with stable matching procedures.
We now look at strategic issues in the model. In the strategic version of this
problem each agent’s preference over his/her possible mates is private information.
A question of fundamental interest is the following: does there exist a stable,
strategy-proof matching procedure? The answer is negative.
Definition 2.4 A matching procedure f is strategy-proof if there does not exist
i ∈ I, Pi, P ′i ∈ Pi, and P−i ∈ ×j 6=iPj such that
fi(P
′
i , P−i)Pifi(Pi, P−i)
Theorem 2.1 Roth (1982)
A stable and strategy-proof matching procedure does not exist.
In this paper, we explore the consequences of weakening the incentive require-
ment for stable matching procedures from strategy-proofness to ordinal Bayesian
incentive compatibility. This concept originally appeared in d’Aspremont and Peleg
(1988) and we describe it formally below.
Definition 2.5 A belief for an individual i is a probability distribution on the set
P, i.e. it is a map µi : P → [0, 1] such that ∑
P∈P
µi(P ) = 1.
We assume that all individuals have a common prior belief µ. For all µ, for all
P−i and Pi, we shall let µ(P−i|Pi) denote the conditional probability of P−i given
Pi.
Consider a manm. The utility function um : W∪{m} → < represents Pm ∈ Pm,
if and only if for all i, j ∈ W ∪ {m},
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iPmj ⇔ um(i) > u(j)
The utility function uw for a woman w is similarly defined.
For any agent i ∈ I we will denote the set of utility functions representing Pi
by Ui(Pi).
We can now define the notion of incentive compatibility that we use in the
essay.
Definition 2.6 A matching procedure f is ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compat-
ible (OBIC) with respect to the belief µ if for all i ∈ I, for all Pi , P ′i ∈ Pi, for all
ui ∈ U(Pi), we have
∑
P−i∈P−i
ui (fi(Pi, P−i))µ(P−i|Pi) ≥
∑
P−i∈P−i
ui (fi(P
′
i , P−i))µ(P−i|Pi) (1)
Let f be a matching procedure and consider the following game of incomplete
information as formulated in Harsanyi (1967). The set of types for a player i is Pi
which is also the set from which i chooses an action. If player i’s type is Pi, and
if the action tuple chosen by the players is P ′, then player i’s payoff is u(f(P ′))
where u is a utility function which represents Pi. Player i’s beliefs are given by the
probability distribution µ. The matching procedure is OBIC if truth-telling is a
Bayes-Nash equilibrium of this game. Since matching procedures under consider-
ation are ordinal by assumption there is no “natural” utility function for expected
utility calculations. Under these circumstances OBIC requires that a player cannot
gain in expected utility (conditional on type) by unilaterally misrepresenting his
preferences no matter what utility function is used to represent his true preferences.
It is possible to give an alternative definition of OBIC in terms of stochastic
dominance. Let f be a matching procedure and pick an individual i and a pref-
erence ordering Pi. Suppose that j is the first-ranked mate for i under Pi. Let α
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denote the probability conditional on Pi that i is matched with j when i announces
Pi assuming that other agents are truthful as well. Thus α is the sum of µ(P−i|Pi)
over all P−i such that fi(Pi, P−i) = j (that is, i is matched to j). Similarly, let β
be the probability that i is matched to j when i announces P ′i , i.e., β is the sum
of µ(P−i|Pi) over all P−i such that fi(P ′i , P−i) = j. If f is OBIC with respect to µ
we must have α ≥ β. Suppose this is false. Consider now a utility function that
gives a utility of one to j (i’s top-ranked mate under Pi) and virtually zero to all
other possible mates for i. This utility function will represent Pi and the expected
utility from announcing the truth for agent i with preferences Pi is strictly lower
than from announcing P ′i . Using a similar argument, it follows that the probability
of obtaining the first k ranked mates according to Pi under truth-telling must be
at least as great as under misreporting via P ′i . We make these ideas precise below.
For any agent i ∈ I, let Ii be the set of possible mates for i. Thus if i ≡ m ∈M ,
then Ii = W ∪ {m} and if i ≡ w then Ii = M ∪ {w}. For all Pi ∈ Pi and
k = 1, · · · , |Ii|, let rk(Pi) denote the k th ranked mate in Pi, i.e., rk(Pi) = j implies
that |{l 6= j|lPij}| = k − 1. For all i ∈ I, for any Pi ∈ Pi and for any j ∈ Ii, let
B(j, Pi) = {l ∈ Ii|lPij} ∪ {j}. Thus B(j, Pi) is the set of mates that are weakly
preferred to j under Pi.
The stable matching procedure f is OBIC with respect to the belief µ if for all
i ∈ I, for all integers k = 1, · · · , |Ii| and for all Pi and P ′i ,
µ({P−i|fi(Pi, P−i) ∈ B(rk(Pi), Pi)}|Pi) ≥ µ({P−i|fi(P ′i , P−i) ∈ B(rk(Pi), Pi)}|Pi)
(2)
A similar definition of OBIC appears in Majumdar and Sen (2003). We omit
the proof of the equivalence of the two definitions of OBIC. The proof is easy and
we refer the interested reader to Theorem 3.11 in d’Aspremont and Peleg (1988).
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3 The Case of Unrestricted Preferences
The main result of this section is to show that there does not exist any stable mar-
riage procedure that is OBIC with respect to any prior belief µ1. In an earlier paper,
Roth (1989) extends the analysis of Roth (1982) by weakening the truth-telling re-
quirement to Bayesian incentive compatibility. However, he assumes particular
cardinalization of utilities. The paper shows that there exists specific utility values
and probability distributions for which no stable matching procedure is Bayesian
incentive compatible. The paper therefore, does not rule out the possibility that
there may exist utility profiles and probability distributions for which there exist
Bayesian incentive compatible stable procedures. However, since stable matchings
are based only on ordinal preferences, it is possible to argue that OBIC is a more
appropriate equilibrium notion. We have the following strong negative result.
Theorem 3.1 Let |M |, |W | ≥ 2 and assume that there are no restrictions on the
preferences of individuals. Then for any prior belief µ, there does not exist a stable
matching procedure f such that f is OBIC with respect to µ.
Let f be a stable matching procedure. We first establish a lemma which says the
following: consider an agent i ∈ I and two preference orderings Pi and P ′i such
that r1(Pi) = r1(P
′
i ) = j. However under preference ordering P
′
i agent i prefers to
remain single than to be matched to any agent other than j. Lemma 3.1 shows
that if for some combination of others preferences P−i, f picks j to be i’s mate
when i reports Pi, then f should pick j as i’s mate when i reports P
′
i . Formally
we show the following:
Lemma 3.1 Consider an agent i ∈ I and two preferences Pi and P ′i such that
r1(Pi) = r1(P
′
i ) = j and r2(P
′
i ) = i. Then for any P−i ∈ P−i,
1The result holds even if we do away with the assumption of common priors
10
[fi(Pi, P−i) = j]⇒ [fi(P ′i , P−i) = j]
PROOF: It follows from the definition of stable matching that fi(P
′
i , P−i) ∈
{j, i}. Suppose that fi(P ′i , P−i) = i. Observe that for agent j, i ∈ A(Pj) ∪ {j}.
Also since the preferences for all the agents other than i have not changed, we
claim that any k such that kPji will not be matched to j under the preference
profile (P ′i , P−i). Suppose that the claim is not true and suppose that there exists
a k with kPji such that, k = fj(P
′
i , P−i). Since f is a stable matching proce-
dure it follows that fk(P )Pkj, otherwise (k, j) would have blocked the matching
selected by f under the profile P . Let l = fk(P ). Replicating the arguments
above one can show that fl(P
′
i , P−i)Plfl(P ) = k. Otherwise k and l would block
the matching f(P ′i , P−i). Let fl(P
′
i , P−i) = k
′ 6= k. Observe that k′ 6= i for in
the matching f(P ′i , P−i), i is remaining single. Again by analogous arguments
it follows that fk′(P )Pk′fk′(P
′
i , P−i) = l. Thus there exists a sequence of pairs
{(kn, ln)|n = 1, 2, 3, · · ·} where any two pairs are distinct (i.e., for any n1 and n2,
kn1 6= kn2 and ln1 6= ln2) such that k1 = i, l1 = j and
ln = fkn(P )Pknfkn(P
′
i , P−i) = ln+1 and
kn+1 = fln(P
′
i , P−i)Plnfln(P ) = kn
Since I is finite there exists a n? such that,
ln? = fkn? (P )Pkn?fkn? (P
′
i , P−i) and,
there does not exist a kˆ ∈ I \ {kn}n?n=1 such that kˆPln?fln? (P ). Then (kn? , ln?)
will block the matching f(P ′i , P−i). Therefore it follows that any k such that kPji
will not be matched to j under (P ′i , P−i). This proves the claim. Therefore if
fi(P
′
i , P−i) = i it implies that for agents i and j,
jP ′ifi(P
′
i , P−i) = i and
iPjfj(P
′
i , P−i)
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Then f is not a stable matching procedure. We thus have a contradiction. There-
fore fi(P
′
i , P−i) = j.
Proof of Theorem 3.3.1 Let f be OBIC with respect to µ. Pick i ∈ I and
preferences Pi and P
′
i . From (3.2) we get,
µ({P−i|fi(Pi, P−i) = r1(Pi)}|Pi) ≥ µ({P−i|fi(P ′i , P−i) = r1(Pi)}|Pi) (3)
Consider a preference profile P such that, Pm1 := w1Pm1w2Pm1m1; Pm2 :=
w2Pm2w1Pm2m2; Pw1 := m2Pw1m1Pw1w1; Pw2 := m1Pw2m2Pw2w2; also let Pj :=
j for all j ∈ I \ {m1,m2, w1, w2}. It is easy to check that S(P ) consists of
two matchings ν1 and ν2 where ν1(m1) = w1, ν1(m2) = w2, ν1(j) = j for all
j ∈ I \ {m1,m2, w1, w2}, ν2(m1) = w2, ν2(m2) = w1 and ν2(j) = j for all
j ∈ I\{m1,m2, w1, w2}. Suppose f(P ) = ν1. Now consider P ′w2 := m1P ′w2w2. Then
we claim that the only stable matching in the profile (P ′w2 , P−w2) is ν2. Suppose
f(P ′w2 , P−w2) = ν. Note that ν(w2) is either m1 or w2. Suppose ν(w2) = w2. Then
either ν(m1) = m1 or ν(m2) = m2. If ν(m1) = m1, then (m1, w2) blocks ν. There-
fore ν(m1) = w1 and ν(m2) = m2. Then (m2, w1) blocks ν. Therefore ν(w2) = m1
and ν(w1) = m2. But then ν = ν2. Since fw2(P ) = m2, fw2(P
′
w2
, P−w2) = m1 and
r1(Pw2) = m1, it must be the case in order for (3.3) to hold that there exists P˜−w2
such that fw2(Pw2 , P˜−w2) = m1 and fw2(P
′
w2
, P˜−w2) 6= m1. But from Lemma 3.3.1
this will never be the case. Thus f(P ) 6= ν1. Therefore f(P ) = ν2. Now consider
P ′m1 := w1P
′
m1
m1. The only stable matching under the profile (P
′
m1
, P−m1) is ν1.
By replicating the earlier argument it follows that if f(P ′m1 , P−m1) = ν1 then f(P )
can never be ν2. But this is a contradiction. This completes the proof of the
theorem.
The result in this section assumes unrestricted preferences, i.e., each man m is
allowed to have any ordering over the set W ∪{m} and similarly each woman w is
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allowed to have any ordering over the set M ∪ {w}. Alcalde and Barbera` (1994)
put restrictions on preferences to obtain strategy-proof stable matchings. In the
next section we put weaker restrictions on preferences to see whether possibility
results with OBIC can be obtained.
4 Restricted Preferences
In this section we examine the stable matching problem for a special class of prefer-
ences. We restrict our attention to the class of preferences where remaining single
is the worst alternative for every agent. That is, each agent prefers to be matched
to some other agent than to remain single.
Formally, the domain D consists of all preferences (Pm, Pw) satisfying the fol-
lowing conditions:
• for all wi ∈ W , wiPmm
• for all mi ∈M , miPww
In this environment a stable matching procedure is a function f : D →M with
the restriction that f(P ) ∈ S(P ) for all P ∈ D. We denote by D−i the set of all
P−i’s, where P−i is the collection of preferences of all agents other than i.
The man proposing and the woman proposing deferred acceptance algorithms
are ways to obtain a stable matching given the preference reports of men and
women. Both algorithms are discussed in Appendix A.
Let fDA(m) denote the stable matching procedure that uses the man proposing
deferred acceptance algorithm and let fDA(w) denote the woman proposing deferred
acceptance algorithm. Roth (1982) demonstrates that with the man proposing
deferred acceptance algorithm it is a dominant strategy for men to truthfully reveal
their preferences i.e., it is strategy-proof for men. Since men and women are
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symmetric in this model, the woman proposing deferred acceptance algorithm is
strategy-proof for women.
Theorem 4.1 Roth (1982)
The stable matching procedure fDA(m), is strategy-proof for men. Similarly,
fDA(w) is strategy-proof for women.
4.1 Uniformly and Independently Distributed Priors
In this section, we assume that the beliefs are independently and uniformly dis-
tributed.
Definition 4.1 Individual i’s beliefs are independent if for all k = 1, · · · , |I| there
exist probability distributions µk : Pk → [0, 1] such that, for all P−i and Pi,
µ(P−i|Pi) = ×k 6=iµk(Pk)
An individual’s belief is independent if his conditional belief about the types of
the other individuals is a product measure of the marginals over the types of the
other individuals. We also assume that the beliefs are uniform.
Definition 4.2 For all profiles P, P ′ ∈ P, we have
µ(P ) = µ(P ′)
We denote these independent, uniform priors by µ¯. Restating Definition 3.6 in
the present context, we have
Proposition 4.1 The matching procedure f is OBIC with respect to the belief µ¯
if, for all i, for all integers k = 1, · · · , |Ii|, for all Pi and P ′i , we have
|{P−i|fi(Pi, P−i) ∈ B(rk(Pi), Pi)}| ≥ |{P−i|fi(P ′i , P−i) ∈ B(rk(Pi), Pi)}| (4)
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We omit the trivial proof of this Proposition.
Roth and Rothblum (1999) define a particular type of belief for agents which
they call “symmetric” beliefs. Symmetric beliefs are discussed in Appendix B. We
note that independent, uniform beliefs are symmetric. They show that if the stable
matching procedure is fDA(m) then for a woman with symmetric beliefs, a strategy
that changes her true preference ordering of men is stochastically dominated by
a strategy that states the same number of acceptable men in their correct order,
i.e., in the order of the true preference ordering. The same is true for men when
the matching procedure is fDA(w). The following theorem can be treated as an
equilibrium interpretation of the Roth and Rothblum results.
Theorem 4.2 The stable marriage procedures fDA(m) : D → M and fDA(w) :
D →M are OBIC with respect to the uniform prior.
PROOF: We give the proof for fDA(m). The proof for fDA(w) is analogous.
From Theorem 4.1 we know that fDA(m) is strategy-proof for men. So we only need
to check whether fDA(m) is OBIC with respect to the uniform prior for women.
Observe that if any w ∈ W has uniformly and independently distributed prior
belief then her conditional belief is {M}-symmetric (the concept of {M}-symmetry
is discussed in Appendix B ). So Proposition 7.1 (again we refer the reader to
Appendix B) applies and hence any strategy that changes her true preference
ordering of men is stochastically dominated by a strategy that states the same
number of acceptable men in their correct order. However, when preference profiles
are in D, for any w ∈ W with preference order Pw, the only strategy that states
w’s set of acceptable men in their correct order is Pw. Since OBIC is equivalent to
the stochastic domination of truth-telling this proves the theorem.
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4.2 Generic Priors
The main result in this section is to show that the possibility result of the previous
section vanish if the beliefs are slightly perturbed. We continue to assume first
that the beliefs are independent.
For each agent i, we let ∆(i) denote the set of all beliefs over the possible types
of i. If i is a man, ∆(i) is a unit simplex of dimension (|W |+1)!−1. If i is a woman,
∆(i) is a unit simplex of dimension (|M |+1)!−1. The set of all independent priors
∆I = ×i∈I∆(i). For an agent i and belief µ ∈ ∆I , we shall let µ−i i’s conditional
belief over the types of agents other than i. For instance µ−i(P−i) will denote the
probability under µ that the preferences of agents other than i, is P−i. The set of
all such conditional beliefs will be denoted by ∆CI . Clearly, ∆CI = ×k 6=i∆(k).
We now state the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.3 Let |M | = |W | ≥ 3 and assume that all individuals have indepen-
dent beliefs. Then for all i ∈ I, there exists a subset Ci of ∆CI(i) such that
• Ci is open and dense in ∆CI(i)
• ∆CI(i)− Ci has Lebesgue measure zero
• there does not exist a stable marriage procedure f : D → M that is OBIC
w.r.t the belief µ where µ−i ∈ Ci for all i ∈ I.
PROOF: The proof proceeds in three steps. In Step 1 we define the sets Ci and
show that they are open and dense subsets of ∆CI(i) and the Lebesgue measure of
their complement sets are zero. In Step 2 we show that if a matching procedure
f is OBIC with respect to µ with µ−i ∈ Ci for all i, then f must satisfy a certain
property which we call Top Monotonicity(TM). In Step 3 we complete the proof
by showing that stable matching procedure violates TM.
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STEP1:
Pick an individual i. We define the set Ci below.
For any Q ⊆ D−i, let µ−i(Q) = ∑
P−i∈Q
µ−i(P−i). The set Ci is defined as the set
of conditional beliefs µ−i satisfying the following property:For all Q, T ⊆ D−i
[µ−i(Q) = µ−i(T )]⇒ [Q = T ]
For any belief µ and agent i the conditional belief µ−i belongs to Ci if it assigns
equal probabilities to two “events” Q and T only if Q = T . Obviously the events
O and T are defined over preference orderings of individuals other than i. In this
step we show that Ci is open and dense in ∆CI(i) and that its complement set
has Lebesgue measure zero. Observe that Ci is generic in the space of conditional
probabilities generated by an independent prior. It is not generic in the space of all
probability distributions.
We first show that Ci is open in ∆CI(i). Consider any µ such that for all i ∈ I,
µ−i ∈ Ci. Let,
φ(µ) = minS,T⊂×k 6=iPk, S 6=T |µ−i(S)− µ−i(T )|
Observe that φ(µ) > 0. Since φ is a continuous function of µ, there exists  > 0
such that for all product measures µˆ ∈ δI with d(µˆ, µ)w < ,2 we have φ(µˆ) > 0.
But this implies µˆ−i ∈ Ci. Therefore Ci is open in ∆CI(i).
We now show that, ∆CI(i)− Ci has Lebesgue measure zero. we begin with the
observation that ∆CI(i) = ×k 6=i∆(k). That is, ∆CI(i) is the cartesian product of
unit simplices ∆(k)s, and each ∆(k) is of dimension (|M |+1)!−1 = (|W |+1)!−1.
On the other hand,
∆CI(i)− Ci = ⋃Q,T⊂×k 6=iPk{µ ∈ ∆CI |µ−i(Q) = µ−i(T )}
2d(., .) here signifies Euclidean distance
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Therefore the set ∆CI(i)− Ci is the union of a finite number of hyper-surfaces
intersected with ∆CI(i). It follows immediately that it is a set of lower dimension
and hence has zero Lebesgue measure.
Pick a product measure µ such that for some i, µ−i ∈ ∆CI(i)−Ci and consider
an open neighborhood of radius  > 0 with center µ−i. Since this neighborhood
has strictly positive measure and since ∆CI(i)−Ci has measure zero, it must be the
case that the neighborhood has non-empty intersection with Ci. This establishes
that Ci is dense in ∆CI(i).
This completes Step 1.
STEP 2:
Let f be a matching procedure that is OBIC with respect to the belief µ where
µ−i ∈ Ci for all i. In this step we show that f must satisfy Property TM. Let P be
a preference profile, let i be an individual and let P ′i be an ordering such that the
top-ranked mate in Pi is the same as the top-ranked element in P
′
i . Let us denote
this top-ranked mate for i by j. Then property TM requires that if i is matched to
j when the reported preference profile is P i.e., fi(P ) = j, then i must be matched
to j when the reported preference profile is (P ′i , P−i) i.e., fi(P ′i , P−i) = j. We
give the formal definition below.
Definition 4.3 The marriage procedure f satisfies TM, if for all individuals i,
for all P−i and for all Pi, P ′i such that r1(Pi) = r1(P
′
i ), we have
fi(Pi, P−i) = r1(Pi)⇒ fi(P ′i , P−i) = r1(P ′i )
Let i be an individual and let Pi and P
′
i be such that r1(Pi) = r1(P
′
i ). Suppose
i’s “true” preference is Pi. Since f is OBIC with respect to µ, we have, by using
equation (3.2)
µ({P−i|fi(Pi, P−i) = r1(Pi)}) ≥ µ({P−i|fi(P ′i , P−i) = r1(P ′i )}) (5)
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Suppose i’s true preference is P ′i . Applying equation (3.2) we have
µ({P−i|fi(P ′i , P−i) = r1(P ′i )}) ≥ µ({P−i|fi(Pi, P−i) = r1(Pi)}) (6)
Combining (3.5) and (3.6) and using the fact that r1(Pi) = r1(P
′
i ) we get,
µ({P−i|fi(Pi, P−i) = r1(Pi)}) = µ({P−i|fi(P ′i , P−i) = r1(P ′i )}) (7)
Since µ(P−i) ∈ Ci it follows from (3.7) that,
{P−i|fi(Pi, P−i) = r1(Pi)} = {P−i|fi(P ′i , P−i) = r1(P ′i )} (8)
Thus, if for some Pi fi(Pi, P−i) = r1(Pi), then (3.8) implies that fi(P ′i , P−i) =
r1(P
′
i ). Therefore f satisfies TM.
STEP 3: In this step we complete the proof of the theorem by showing that a
stable matching procedure does not satisfy TM.
Let |M | = |W | ≥ 3 and let f : D → M be a stable matching procedure, i.e.,
for all P ∈ D, f(P ) ∈ S(P ). Consider a preference profile P defined as follows:
Pm1 := w2Pm1w1Pm1w3Pm1 , · · · , Pm1m1
Pm2 := w1Pm2w2Pm2w3Pm2 , · · · , Pm2m2
Pm3 := w1Pm3w2Pm3w3Pm3 , · · · , Pm3m3
Pw1 := m1Pw1m3Pw1m2Pw1 , · · · , Pw1w1
Pw2 := m3Pw2m1Pw2m2Pw2 , · · · , Pw2w2
Pw3 := m1Pw3m2Pw3m3Pw3 , · · · , Pw3w3
For all k 6= 1, 2, 3, Pmk := wkPmk , · · · , Pmkmk and Pwk := mkPwk , · · · , Pwkwk.
We claim that S(P ) = {ν1, ν2} where,
ν1 = [(m1, w2), (m2, w3), (m3, w1), (mk, wk), k 6= 1, 2, 3]
ν2 = [(m1, w1), (m2, w3), (m3, w2), (mk, wk), k 6= 1, 2, 3]
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Observe that , in any stable matching m2 must be matched with w3; otherwise
either (m1, w2) or (m3, w1) will block. Given that, there are only two other possible
combinations: one wherem1 is matched with w1 and the other wherem1 is matched
to w2. Both give rise to stable outcomes since there is no pair that will block the
matching. Let f(P ) = ν1. Then fw1(P ) = m3. Now consider the preference
ordering Pˆw1 given by
Pˆw1 := m1Pˆw1m2Pˆw1m3Pˆw1 , · · · , w1
We claim that S(Pˆw1 , P−w1) = ν2. Observe that in any stable matching in
the profile (Pˆw1 , P−w1), m3 must be matched to w2; otherwise, either (m1, w1) or
(m3, w2) will block. Also, m2 has to be matched to w3; otherwise, m1 and w1 would
block the matching. Hence the only stable matching is ν2. Then fw1(Pˆw1 , P−w1) =
m1. But if fw1(Pˆw1 , P−w1) = m1 it follows from TM that, fw1(P ) should also be
m1. Hence f(P ) 6= ν1. Therefore, f(P ) = ν2. Now consider a preference ordering
for m1, Pˆm1 given by,
Pˆm1 := w2Pˆm1w3Pˆm1w1Pˆm1 , · · · , Pˆm1m1
Replicating the earlier arguments we conclude that S(Pˆm1 , P−m1) = ν1. Then
fm1(Pˆm1 , P−m1) = w2. But then TM implies that fm1(P ) should also be w2 i.e.,
f(P ) = ν1. But this is a contradiction for we have shown above that f(P ) 6= ν1.
This completes the proof of the theorem.
REMARK 3.4.1: The result in Theorem 3.4.3 is valid even when |M | 6= |W |.
LetM = {m1, · · · ,mn} andW = {w1, · · · , wm}. Without loss of generality assume
that m < n. Consider the preference profile P defined in the following way:
for all k ≤ m, Pik is defined in the same way as above; for k > m, Pmk :=
w3Pmk , · · · , Pmkmk. Observe that under the preference profile P any selection
from the set of stable marriages divides the set of agents into three groups: men
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m1,m2 and m3 and women w1, w2 and w3 form matchings among themselves; wk
is matched to mk for all 3 < k ≤ m and the remaining set of men are forced
to remain single. Now replicating the arguments above we obtain the result in
Theorem 3.4.3.
REMARK 3.4.2: When there are only two agents on each side of the market
and preferences are restricted to the set D, Alcalde and Barbera` (1994) show
that the stable matching selections obtained by the man-proposing and woman-
proposing deferred acceptance algorithms are both strategy-proof.
5 Conclusion
We have examined the implications of weakening the incentive requirement in
the theory of two-sided one-to-one matching from dominant strategies to ordinal
Bayesian incentive compatibility. Truth-telling is no longer assumed to be optimal
for every conceivable strategy-tuple of the other players. It is only required to
maximize expected utility given an agents’ prior beliefs about the types of other
players and the assumption that these players are following truth-telling strategies.
The set of ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible stable matching procedures clearly
depends on the beliefs of each agent. However, we show that when preferences
are unrestricted, there is no stable matching procedure that is ordinally Bayesian
incentive compatible with respect to any prior. When we put restrictions on the set
of allowable preferences, by requiring that every agent prefers to be matched than
to remain single, one obtains possibility results with independently and uniformly
distributed priors. However the possibility result is non-generic. If we perturb
beliefs we get back the impossibility result.
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6 Appendix A: Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
Man Proposing Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
Step 1: Each man makes an offer to the first woman on his preference list of
acceptable women. Each woman rejects the offer of any firm that is unacceptable
to her, and each woman who receives more than one acceptable offer rejects all but
her most preferred of these which she “holds”.
Step k: Any man whose offer was rejected at the previous step makes an offer
to his next choice (i.e., to his most preferred woman among those who have not
yet rejected it), so long as there remains an acceptable woman to whom he has not
yet made an offer. If a man has already made an offer to all the women he finds
acceptable and has been rejected by all of them, then he makes no further offers.
Each woman receiving offers rejects any from unacceptable men, and also rejects
all but her most preferred among the set consisting of the new offers together with
an offer she may have held from the previous step.
Stop: The algorithm stops after any step in which no man’s offer has been
rejected. At this point, every man is either being matched to some woman or
his offer has been rejected by every woman in his list of acceptable women. The
output of the algorithm is the matching at which each woman is matched to the
man whose offer she is holding at the time the algorithm stops. Women who do
not receive any acceptable offer or men who were rejected by all women acceptable
to them remain unmatched.
7 Appendix B: Symmetric beliefs
In this section, we briefly discuss symmetric beliefs. For the ensuing analysis some
definitions are in order. For a given preference profile, denote by PS the preference
orders of the agents in the subset S ⊆ I. Denote by Pm↔m′S the preference orders
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of the agents in S obtained from P by switching m and m′, i.e., each woman
in S exchanges the places of m and m′ in her preference list and if m is in S his
preference is Pm′ and if m
′ is in S its preference is Pm. Note that if woman w’s true
preferences are given by Pw, then P
m↔m′
w is the preference in which she reverses
the order of m and m′ (but otherwise states her true preferences). Similarly, P−w
and Pm↔m
′
−w are assessments by agent w of the preferences of all other agents that
are identical except that the roles of m and m′ are everywhere reversed.
We model agent w’s uncertainty about the about the differences in the prefer-
ences of men m and m′, and about the other women’s preferences for the two men
as follows:
Definition 7.1 Given distinct men m and m′ we say woman w’s conditional
belief µ(.|Pw) is {m,m′} -symmetric if µ(P−w|Pw) = µ(Pm↔m′−w |Pw).
Observe that w may know a great deal about m and m′ ( for example w may
know that both men prefer w′ to some w′′). What w does not know about m and
m′, if her conditional beliefs are {m,m′}-symmetric are any differences in their
preferences, or in other women’s preferences between them.
Definition 7.2 For a woman w ∈ W and a set of men U ⊆M , we say that w’s
conditional belief µ(.|Pw) is {U}-symmetric if it is {m,m′}-symmetric for every
pair (m,m′) of distinct members of U .
If U = M then woman w’s belief is {M}-symmetric. We can similarly define
{W}-symmetric beliefs for a man m ∈M .
Proposition 7.1 ( Corollary 1 in Roth and Rothblum (1999))
For a woman with {M}-symmetric conditional belief, any strategy that changes
the true preference ordering of men is stochastically dominated by a strategy that
states the same number of acceptable men in their correct order.
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Observe that the uniform prior µ¯ is {M}-symmetric for the women and {W}-
symmetric for men.
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